Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 4
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
A Proposal for the Design of the Successor to the Kyoto Protocol AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Zhao, Jinhua.
The successor to the Kyoto Protocol should impose national ceilings on rich countries’ greenhouse gas emissions and promote voluntary abatement by developing countries. Our proposal gives signatories the option of exercising an escape clause that relaxes their requirement to abate. This feature helps to solve the participation and compliance problems that have weakened the Protocol. We support the use of carefully circumscribed trade restrictions in order to reduce the real or perceived problem of carbon leakage.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Kyoto protocol; Escape clause; Emissions trade; Clean development mechanism; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q54; Q58; F13.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42878
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Enrichment Planting in Secondary Forests: a Promising Clean Development Mechanism to Increase Terrestrial Carbon Sinks Ecology and Society
Hawryshyn, Jessica; Department of Biology and McGill School of Environment, McGill University; jessica.hawryshyn@gmail.com; Senikas, Alexandra Vyta; Department of Biology and McGill School of Environment, McGill University; alexandra.senikas@mail.mcgill.ca; Potvin, Catherine; Department of Biology and McGill School of Environment, McGill University; Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute; catherine.potvin@mcgill.ca.
With the increasing need to reduce greenhouse gas concentrations, afforestation and reforestation (A/R) projects are being implemented under the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and under the voluntary carbon (C) market. The specific objective of A/R C projects is to enhance terrestrial sinks. They could also provide low-income communities in developing countries with a source of revenue, as well as a number of ecological and social services. However, feasibility issues have hindered implementation of A/R CDMs. We propose enrichment planting (EP) in old fallow using high-value native timber species as a land-use alternative and a small-scale C projects opportunity. We present EP in the context of ongoing work in a poor indigenous community in...
Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Insight Palavras-chave: Biodiversity; Carbon sequestration; Clean development mechanism; Enrichment planting; Indigenous communities; Payments for environmental services; Secondary forests.
Ano: 2009
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Host Country Attractiveness for CDM Non-Sink Projects AgEcon
Jung, Martina.
In the present study, CDM host countries are classified according to their attractiveness for CDM non-sink projects. A cluster analysis is conducted based on three different factors determining host country attractiveness (mitigation potential, institutional CDM capacity and general investment climate) in order to elaborate a CDM host country classification. The results suggest that only a small proportion of potential host countries will attract most of the CDM investment. The CDM (non-sink) stars are China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia and Thailand. They are followed by attractive countries like Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Mongolia, Panama, and Chile. While most of the promising CDM host countries are located in Latin...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Clean development mechanism; Kyoto Protocol; Attractiveness; Cluster analysis; Farm Management; Q25; C49.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26328
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Suggestions for the Road to Copenhagen AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Zhao, Jinhua.
We provide a unified discussion of the issues that confront negotiators of the next international climate agreement. We offer a novel proposal that entitles countries to discharge their treaty obligations by paying a “fine”. This escape clause provides cost insurance, simplifies the problem of enforcing compliance, and increases incentives to participate in the agreement. We explain why developed country obligations should rely on a cap and trade commitment rather than carbon taxes. A Central Bank maintains stability of carbon prices by defending a price ceiling and floor. An so-called intensity target is not a good alternative to an emissions cap. Modest trade restrictions, consistent with WTO law, will form an important part of the next agreement....
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Kyoto protocol; Escape clause; Emissions trade; Taxes versus cap and trade; Price stability; Carbon leakage; Trade restrictions; Differentiated responsibility; Clean development mechanism; Sectoral agreements; Demand and Price Analysis; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q54; Q58; F13.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51610
Registros recuperados: 4
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional